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REEXAMINING JOINT EMPLOYMENT WAGE 
AND HOUR CLAIMS FOLLOWING DYNAMEX 
AND AB 5 
Alexander Moore* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2017, Jeffery Lines sued his employer, Tenet Concepts 
(“Tenet”), alleging that the company violated wage and hour laws by 
altering paychecks to avoid payment of overtime1 and by forcing em-
ployees to work off-the-clock, including during meal breaks.2 Lines 
was one of over four hundred delivery drivers employed by Tenet3 but 
effectively working for Amazon. Rather than employ its own drivers, 
Amazon contracted with Tenet to provide the labor necessary to allow 
for same-day delivery of products listed on Amazon. These drivers, 
though officially Tenet employees, operated out of Amazon ware-
houses, delivered Amazon packages, and wore Amazon uniforms.4 
Accordingly, Lines also listed Amazon as a defendant on the com-
plaint,5 alleging that Amazon and Tenet jointly employed him and the 
other drivers.6 However, through an indemnification clause, Tenet was 
required to pay for Amazon’s defense.7 Fearing an anticipated 
$800,000 in legal costs, Tenet filed for bankruptcy protection.8 Lines’s 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2021, Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Law School, Los An-
geles; B.A., Political Science, Tufts University, 2014. Many thanks to Professor Carlos Berdejo for 
his insightful comments and to the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for 
their keen eyes. The views expressed in this Comment are my own, as are any remaining errors and 
omissions. 
 1. First Amended Complaint at 2, Lines v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 1:17-00072-LY (W.D. 
Tex. Apr. 14, 2017). 
 2. Id. at 10. 
 3. Id. at 8. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 1. 
 6. Id. at 7. 
 7. Patricia Callahan, Amazon Pushes Fast Shipping but Avoids Responsibility for the Human 
Cost, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/05/us/amazon-delivery-driv-
ers-accidents.html. 
 8. Id. 
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case was transferred to bankruptcy court, where Lines’s claim against 
Amazon was stalled.9 Though Amazon was the true beneficiary of 
Lines’s labor, and despite Amazon being the second company in world 
history to be valued at over $1 trillion,10 Lines was unable to recover 
his back wages of $7.25 per hour.11 Through its choice to outsource 
its labor needs to Tenet, rather than employ its own delivery drivers, 
Amazon effectively avoided the costs of employment and the liability 
for labor violations stemming from the delivery of Amazon products. 
How did this come to be? 
Employment status confers many benefits to a worker. Most im-
portantly for the purposes of this Comment, employment determines 
a worker’s right to minimum wage and overtime protections.12 It also 
entitles a worker to Social Security benefits, unemployment, worker’s 
compensation, and the federal rights to collective bargaining and free-
dom from discrimination.13 These benefits, though, create substantial 
costs for employers. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
employment benefits represent nearly 30 percent of an employee’s to-
tal compensation costs, with standard wages representing the remain-
ing 70 percent.14 
To avoid these costs, some employers rely on legal—but prob-
lematic—means of shifting responsibility. National media has focused 
extensively on the gig economy, wherein companies, such as the 
rideshare giants Lyft and Uber, rely on workers classified as independ-
ent contractors to form their labor force.15 Because independent con-
tractors do not receive the benefits associated with employment, they 
are 20 to 30 percent cheaper than employees.16 If their drivers were 
 
 9. Id.; Order Granting Motion to Transfer Venue, Lines v. Amazon.com, Inc., 1:17-00072-
LY (W.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2018). 
 10. David Streitfeld, Amazon Hits $1,000,000,000,000 in Value, Following Apple, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/technology/amazon-stock-price-1-trillion-
value.html?searchResultPosition=1. 
 11. Callahan, supra note 7; First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 8. 
 12. Naomi B. Sunshine, Employees as Price-Takers, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 105, 115 
(2018). 
 13. Id. at 115–16. 
 14. U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., EMPLOYER COSTS FOR EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION—
DECEMBER 2019, at 1 (2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ecec_03192020.pdf. 
 15. See Eli Rosenberg, Can California Rein in Tech’s Gig Platforms? A Primer on the Bold 
State Law That Will Try, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2020, 10:32 AM), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/business/2020/01/14/can-california-reign-techs-gig-platforms-primer-bold-state-law-
that-will-try/. 
 16. Id. 
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classified as employees, it is estimated that Lyft and Uber would be 
required to pay an additional $3,625 per driver annually in taxes and 
benefits.17 Instead, these costs are passed onto the workers themselves, 
who must pay their own self-employment taxes and bear the risks of 
unemployment and work-related injury. 
In recent years, this practice of purposefully labelling workers as 
independent contractors to avoid the costs of employment—known as 
misclassification—has come to the forefront of California politics. In 
2018, the California Supreme Court introduced the ABC test for mis-
classification schemes in its case Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. 
Superior Court.18 This test, discussed in detail below, greatly limits an 
employer’s ability to avoid the costs of its employees by misclassify-
ing them as independent contractors. In 2019, the California legisla-
ture passed Assembly Bill 5 (AB 5), which codified the ABC test and 
was seen as a direct attack on Lyft and Uber’s practices.19 In 2020, 
after spending roughly $200 million, Lyft and Uber led a successful 
ballot initiative, known as Proposition 22, which exempted app-based 
delivery and rideshare companies from the ABC test, allowing these 
companies to continue to classify their drivers as independent contrac-
tors.20 
This fight over misclassification has largely overshadowed a sep-
arate—but closely related—means by which businesses in California 
have avoided the costs of employment. Just as Lyft and Uber use in-
dependent contractor classification to pass costs directly onto their 
workers, other businesses contract out their labor needs to separate 
entities that—at least in theory—carry the costs of employing workers. 
This practice can be illustrated by the Lines case. For the purposes of 
this Comment, the business engaging in—and benefitting from—this 
practice will be deemed the “lead,” exemplified by Amazon; the busi-
ness that supplies labor will be deemed the “intermediary,” like Tenet. 
 
 17. Alison Griswold, How Much It Would Cost Uber and Lyft if Drivers Were Employees, 
QUARTZ (June 14, 2019), https://qz.com/1643263/the-cost-to-uber-and-lyft-if-drivers-were-em-
ployees/. 
 18. 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018). 
 19. Rosenberg, supra note 15; Assemb. B. 5, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
 20. Taryn Luna, California Voters Approve Prop. 22, Allowing Uber and Lyft Drivers to Re-
main Independent Contractors, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/califor-
nia/story/2020-11-03/2020-california-election-tracking-prop-22; see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE § 7450 (Deering 2021) (codifying the purpose of Prop. 22 as “protect[ing] the basic legal 
right of Californians to choose to work as independent contractors with rideshare and delivery net-
work companies . . . .”). 
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In this business model, the intermediary acts as a buffer for the lead. 
Though the workers are providing labor for the lead, only the interme-
diary is directly liable for labor violations. Because workers can exer-
cise their employment rights against the intermediary, courts can 
evade assessing the lead’s involvement.21 This business arrangement, 
and the failure of the courts to fully consider its effects, has adverse 
consequences on workers. As in Jeffery Lines’s case, a worker may be 
unable to obtain judgment from the intermediary and unable to sustain 
an action against the lead. In fact, as discussed below, the lead-inter-
mediary relationship is itself responsible for promulgating the very la-
bor violations a plaintiff might allege. 
In the lead-intermediary relationship, the intermediary does gen-
erally classify its workers as employees. Thus, laws like AB 5, which 
target misclassification—a practice whereby an employer labels its 
workers as independent contractors to avoid employment costs—are 
not applicable. Because the workers are already the intermediary’s 
employees, the only relevant question is whether they are also the 
lead’s employees.22 
To answer this question, courts have long recognized the doctrine 
of joint employment.23 Under this doctrine, a worker can be deemed 
an employee of more than one employer, opening each employer to 
joint and several liability for wage and hour violations, among other 
abuses.24 The joint employment doctrine arose to complement the 
common law’s strict definition of employment. Under the common 
law, an employer is one who controls the manner and means of the 
employee’s performance of work.25 This definition is grounded in the 
traditional concept of the master-servant relationship, where a master 
physically imposes their will over a servant.26 Direct, physical control 
over a worker became the key inquiry in determining employment un-
der this definition.27 Where control is indirect or abstract, a court is 
 
 21. See, e.g., Curry v. Equilon Enters., 233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 295, 314 (Ct. App. 2018) (finding 
that, where an intermediary has employed the plaintiff workers—and thus the workers have pro-
tections—looser standards are permissible in determining whether the lead is also an employer). 
 22. Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp., 944 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 23. See, e.g., Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195 (1973) (holding a maintenance company and 
an apartment building owner to be joint employers of maintenance workers). 
 24. 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(f) (2019). 
 25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (AM. L. INST. 2006). 
 26. Shirley Lung, Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine: Providing a Break for Sweatshop 
Garment Workers, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 291, 319 (2003). 
 27. Id. 
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much less likely to find an employment relationship.28 Such a defini-
tion is ill-suited in the modern economy, where business formalities, 
such as the lead-intermediary relationship, can be used to attenuate the 
employment relationship.29 
Thus, the federal and state governments have recognized and de-
veloped definitions of employment far more expansive than the com-
mon law.30 One such definition is “to suffer or permit work,” by which 
a business is deemed an employer when work is performed for its ben-
efit, whether authorized or not, provided the business had knowledge 
the work was being performed and an opportunity to prevent it.31 The 
United States Supreme Court has recognized that a broader definition 
of employment would be difficult to fathom,32 and the California Su-
preme Court has held that California’s interpretation is even more ex-
pansive than its federal analogue.33 Still, the federal system has yet to 
standardize its analysis of the “suffer or permit” definition, and the 
California Supreme Court has neutered its application in joint employ-
ment cases. 
This Comment seeks to shed light on the prevalence of the lead-
intermediary relationship, the dangers it presents for workers, and the 
inadequacy of current California law to protect its workers’ rights. 
California’s current standard for joint employment, developed in the 
2010 California Supreme Court case Martinez v. Combs,34 affords a 
far too narrow understanding of California’s expansive “suffer or per-
mit” definition of employment.35 This understanding must be recon-
ciled with Dynamex, wherein the California Supreme Court used the 
“suffer or permit” definition to expand employment rights to workers 
misclassified as independent contractors.36 
This reconciliation is necessary because the Martinez standard, 
which focuses on a business’s direct control over the workers in-
volved, fails to account for a lead’s tacit encouragement of labor vio-
lations by its intermediaries. Only Dynamex’s interpretation, in which 
 
 28. See id. 
 29. Id. at 321. 
 30. See discussion infra Parts III–IV. 
 31. 5 C.F.R. § 551.104 (2020). 
 32. United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362 (1945). 
 33. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 12 (Cal. 2018). 
 34. 231 P.3d 259 (Cal. 2010). 
 35. Id. at 279. 
 36. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 35. 
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a purported employer suffers or permits all work performed within the 
usual course of its business,37 creates liability for leads that implicitly 
benefit from such violations. 
Dynamex’s broader interpretation is supported by the legislative 
and judicial history of the “suffer or permit” standard. Further, the Dy-
namex court’s main policy concern—a fear that lenient laws will per-
petuate labor abuses—is expressed in the joint employment context by 
the inherent dangers of the lead-intermediary relationship. A broad 
joint employment standard will provide leads with an incentive struc-
ture to ensure compliance with labor law. Nevertheless, the use of in-
termediaries can be beneficial to both businesses and the public: 
though employment status should be applied broadly, safeguards 
should exist to protect beneficial intermediary relationships. 
Part II describes the historical necessity for joint employment and 
illustrates the modern means by which leads create sweatshop condi-
tions. Part III provides a counterpoint, emphasizing the benefits of in-
termediary relationships and showing that not all relationships perpet-
uate sweatshop conditions. Part IV tracks the development of federal 
law and the circuit courts’ split over joint employment. Part V explains 
the California courts’ current understanding of joint employment in 
Martinez. Part VI describes Dynamex’s broad proscription of employ-
ment status. Part VII argues for expanding California’s joint employ-
ment standard to match protections given to misclassified workers in 
Dynamex. Part VIII describes available and potential safeguards to al-
low for beneficial uses of intermediaries. Part IX concludes this Com-
ment. 
II.  THE IMPORTANCE OF JOINT EMPLOYMENT 
Employer wage theft, including minimum wage and overtime vi-
olations, is highly prevalent in the United States. Though California is 
widely considered to be an employee-friendly state, its workers remain 
susceptible to wage theft.38 A 2008 report found that, in Los Angeles 
County, 88.5 percent of 1815 employees surveyed had experienced at 
least one type of pay-based violation in the previous week,39 resulting 
 
 37. Id. at 37. 
 38. Matthew Fritz-Mauer, Comment, Lofty Laws, Broken Promises: Wage Theft and the Deg-
radation of Low-Wage Workers, 20 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 71, 73–74 (2016). 
 39. RUTH MILKMAN ET AL., INST. FOR RSCH. ON LAB. & EMP., UNIV. OF CAL., L.A., WAGE 
THEFT AND WORKPLACE VIOLATIONS IN LOS ANGELES: THE FAILURE OF EMPLOYMENT AND 
LABOR LAW FOR LOW-WAGE WORKERS 30 (2010). 
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in a loss of 12.5 percent of average weekly earnings.40 The researchers 
estimated a weekly loss of $26.2 million as a result of such viola-
tions.41 In industries where leads contract out for their labor needs, the 
joint employment doctrine becomes a potential means for workers to 
recover back wages even where their direct employer, the intermedi-
ary, is insolvent or otherwise judgment-proof.42 
More importantly, the joint employment doctrine can also change 
the incentive structure by which leads operate. The use of intermedi-
aries allows leads to engage in business practices which maximize 
profits while tacitly encouraging intermediaries to violate wage and 
hour laws. Historically, these business practices are best exemplified 
by the garment industry’s use of sweatshops, aptly named after a 
lead’s ability to force its intermediaries and their workers to “sweat 
out” profits through the violation of labor law.43 Today, the use of ad-
vanced technology and data collection allows leads to sweat profits 
more effectively and on a larger scale, as illustrated below by Ama-
zon’s use of Delivery Service Providers. 
A.  The Garment Industry and the Traditional Sweat Shop 
Sweatshops—often depicted in popular media as dingy and 
cramped basements brimming with garment workers and overseen by 
an authoritarian supervisor—are inextricably bound to the lead-inter-
mediary relationship. By contracting out their labor needs, garment 
manufacturers have traditionally minimized their fixed production 
costs, shielded themselves from swings in market demand, and 
avoided liability for labor violations.44 The manufacturers’ incentive 
for profit creates a vicious and self-promulgating labor market 
wherein workers are routinely exploited. 
The relationship is deceptively simple: a garment manufacturer 
outsources the production of its garments to several contracted inter-
mediaries. In doing so, the manufacturer passes on the labor and other 
production costs of garment-making, as well as liability for labor vio-
lations. The manufacturer identifies the market need for certain gar-
ments and offers a contract price to an intermediary in return for the 
 
 40. Id. at 53. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 1. 
 43. Lung, supra note 26, at 302. 
 44. Id. at 301. 
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completed garments. The intermediary agrees to the contract price, 
uses it to pay labor costs, and keeps any remaining amount as profit. 
However, the economic reality of the relationship gives the manufac-
turer an inordinate amount of control in setting prices to maximize its 
own profit.45 Intermediaries vastly outnumber manufacturers,46 and 
with a limited number of contracts for garments, intermediaries look-
ing to stay in business must underbid each other.47 Further aggravating 
this power dynamic is the low barrier for creating an intermediary 
business—a small shop, sewing equipment, and a few workers.48 
When one intermediary fails, another rises to take its place, ensuring 
that the manufacturer maintains a selection of competing intermediar-
ies to choose from. 
Because intermediaries have the same incentive as the manufac-
turer to maximize profit, they have a motivation to recoup low contract 
prices by exploiting their workers. To stay in business, and to remain 
profitable, intermediaries violate wage and hour laws.49 Once interme-
diaries choose to engage in these illegal practices, the system becomes 
self-promulgating. Substandard labor conditions create a competitive 
advantage:50 intermediaries that violate labor laws are able to accept 
lower contract prices than those that do not. Over time, this results in 
a “race to the bottom,” wherein labor-compliant intermediaries either 
begin violating the law to stay competitive or are pushed out of busi-
ness by non-compliant intermediaries.51 
Without strong laws, such as an expansive joint employment doc-
trine, workers are left with little recourse. Because of low contract 
prices, intermediaries are chronically undercapitalized52—though 
workers could ostensibly sue for back wages and other violations, 
there is no guarantee that a favorable judgment would result in actual 
recompense. Embattled intermediaries often declare bankruptcy to 
avoid judgment, later re-opening as new businesses.53 Further, 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. at 302. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Bruce Goldstein et. al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American 
Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1003–
04 (1999). 
 51. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 37–38 (Cal. 2018). 
 52. See Goldstein, supra note 50, at 1000. 
 53. Lung, supra note 26, at 305. 
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sweatshops have traditionally preyed upon vulnerable groups, such as 
undocumented immigrants, who are more likely to accept substandard 
labor conditions when faced with adverse immigration outcomes 
should they choose to report abuses.54 
In 1999, in response to the exploitative incentives of the garment 
industry, California passed a law requiring garment manufacturers to 
guarantee the payment of minimum wage and overtime when out-
sourcing their labor needs to intermediaries.55 In 2015, under Califor-
nia Labor Code section 2810.3, the California Legislature extended 
this requirement to many other industries that outsource work per-
formed “within [the] usual course” of their business.56 In 2018, the 
California Labor Commissioner’s Office used section 2810.3 to issue 
a $4.5 million fine against Cheesecake Factory and its janitorial con-
tractor after the contractor failed to pay minimum wages and overtime 
to its custodians.57 Again, in 2019, the Labor Commissioner’s Office 
issued a $1.6 million fine against Trader Joe’s and its inventory con-
tractor for similar failures.58 
However, section 2810.3 is limited to labor that occurs “within or 
upon the premises” of the lead59 and explicitly does not apply to labor 
outsourced to a “motor carrier of property.”60 Thus, the sweating sys-
tem continues to operate unchecked in the delivery industry. In the 
absence of such laws, Amazon has successfully created one of the 
largest and most technologically advanced sweatshops in modern his-
tory. 
B.  Amazon’s Last Mile Delivery System: A Modern-Day Sweatshop 
In a traditional delivery relationship, a business uses true third 
parties, such as the UPS or FedEx, to deliver its goods. The business 
agrees to a standard delivery rate and provides the packages to be 
 
 54. Id. at 307. 
 55. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2673.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
 56. Id. § 2810.3(a)(1)(A). This is a term of art later used in Dynamex as a test for employment 
and a major topic of this Comment. See discussion infra Section VI.C. 
 57. News Release, Cal. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., Labor Commissioner’s Office Cites Cheesecake 
Factory, Janitorial Contractors More than $4.5 Million for Wage Theft Violations (June 11, 2018), 
https://www.dir.ca.gov/DIRNews/2018/2018-40.pdf. 
 58. News Release, Cal. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., California Labor Commissioner’s Office Cites 
Inventory Company, Grocers More than $1.6 Million for Wage Theft Violations (Nov. 5, 2019), 
https://www.dir.ca.gov/DIRNews/2019/2019-83.html. 
 59. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2810.3(a)(6). 
 60. Id. § 2810.3(p). 
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shipped but does not maintain oversight or control over the delivery 
process. Though delivery is an intrinsic part of all e-commerce, the 
delivery itself does not fall within the purview of the seller—it is in-
stead the duty of a third-party carrier like UPS. Amazon, though, blurs 
this line by operating as both a seller of goods and as a delivery com-
pany. Amazon has built its own delivery network rivaling UPS and 
FedEx—in 2018, it was capable of reaching 72 percent of American 
households within 24 hours.61 As noted by the Lines62 case, Amazon 
uses intermediaries, which Amazon calls Delivery Service Providers 
(DSPs), to fulfill its vast demands for speedy home delivery. Under 
this business model, Amazon maintains oversight and control over the 
delivery of its goods in a way that nearly all other e-commerce busi-
nesses do not. This relationship closely mirrors the garment industry’s 
traditional sweatshop model but uses modern technology and Ama-
zon’s massive reserve of wealth to further streamline Amazon’s profit 
maximization. 
Amazon effectively monitors intermediary profit margins and ad-
justs its contracts as necessary to keep those margins thin. Much like 
the garment industry, Amazon pays most of its intermediaries a flat 
contract fee for each delivery route.63 This fee must cover the cost of 
labor, the vehicle lease and its insurance, and any other overhead.64 In 
2018, Amazon began requiring new intermediaries to lease vans from 
Amazon, and to obtain insurance and manage payroll through select 
providers.65 These changes allow Amazon to keep track of how its in-
termediary spends its contract fees to deliver packages and how much 
profit remains.66 Amazon, then, has the knowledge necessary to max-
imize its profits by keeping its intermediaries’ profits low. When 
 
 61. Eugene Kim, Amazon Can Already Ship to 72% of US Population Within a Day, This Map 
Shows, CNBC (May 5, 2019, 3:07 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/05/amazon-can-already-
ship-to-72percent-of-us-population-in-a-day-map-shows.html. 
 62. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 2. 
 63. Caroline O’Donovan & Ken Bensinger, 3,200 Amazon Drivers Are Going to Lose Their 
Jobs, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 27, 2020, 3:22 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/caro-
lineodonovan/3200-amazon-drivers-are-going-to-lose-their-jobs [hereinafter 3,200 Amazon Driv-
ers to Lose Jobs]. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Caroline O’Donovan & Ken Bensinger, The Cost of Next-Day Delivery: Amazon’s Next-
Day Delivery Has Brought Chaos and Carnage to America’s Streets—but the World’s Biggest Re-
tailer Has a System to Escape the Blame, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 6, 2019, 5:14 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/carolineodonovan/amazon-next-day-delivery-deaths 
[hereinafter The Cost of Next-Day Delivery]. 
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Amazon discovers an intermediary making a substantial profit, it can 
change the terms of its contracts—in one case, by rescinding the mon-
ies needed to cover the cost of dispatchers, forcing intermediaries to 
pay those costs out of their profit margins.67 
Amazon can make use of this method for profit maximization be-
cause of its DSPs’ lack of bargaining power, which Amazon itself 
fuels. Amazon initially began its delivery service in 2014 by enlisting 
large delivery firms qualified to handle hundreds or thousands of de-
livery routes.68 In 2018, Amazon began to aggressively shift to small 
intermediaries capable of managing only a few dozen routes, paying 
them as much as 5 percent less per route than its traditional partners.69 
These small companies lack the leverage to negotiate effectively with 
a behemoth like Amazon.70 As in the garment industry, these interme-
diaries may rely exclusively on Amazon for contracts71 and are thus 
forced to compete against each other for these contracts. Amazon 
monitors and ranks the performance of its intermediaries, rewarding 
good performance with more contracts and rescinding contracts from 
intermediaries that fall behind or speak out against Amazon’s prac-
tices.72 An owner of Lasership, an Amazon DSP, stated that asking for 
even a 5 percent raise in contract prices would lead a company like 
Amazon to terminate all contracts with the intermediary.73 Amazon 
further exacerbates this competition by ensuring that it has many in-
termediaries to choose from. Amazon recently claimed to have “ena-
bled the creation” of at least two hundred new intermediaries74 by of-
fering business training and special pricing on vans and insurance 
programs.75 Amazon asserts that entrepreneurs may start a successful 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. 3,200 Amazon Drivers to Lose Jobs, supra note 63. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Callahan, supra note 7. 
 72. The Cost of Next-Day Delivery, supra note 66. 
 73. Farhang Aryan Deposition of Aug. 13, 2012 at 162, Sanchez v. Lasership, Inc., 937 F. 
Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Va. 2013) (1:12-cv-00246-GBL-TRJ), http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/la-
sership_aryan_deposition3.pdf; Dave Jamieson, Meet the Real Amazon Drones, HUFFPOST 
(Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/amazon-delivery-lasership_n_5193956. 
 74. The Cost of Next-Day Delivery, supra note 66. 
 75. Getting Started, AMAZON LOGISTICS, https://logistics.amazon.com/marketing/getting-
started (last visited Feb. 21, 2021); Hayley Peterson, Missing Wages, Grueling Shifts, and Bottles 
of Urine: The Disturbing Accounts of Amazon Delivery Drivers May Reveal the True Hu-
man Cost of ‘Free’ Shipping, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 11, 2018, 10:48 AM),  
https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-delivery-drivers-reveal-claims-of-disturbing-work-con-
ditions-2018-8. 
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DSP business with as little as $10,000,76 and further provides $10,000 
in rebates to select DSPs operated by U.S. veterans.77 The ease with 
which Amazon allows the creation of new intermediaries ensures that 
its DSPs will always have competitors, aggravating the need of DSPs 
to meet Amazon’s goals and maintain their contracts. 
As a result, Amazon’s intermediaries routinely resort to worker 
abuses, creating the sweatshop “race to the bottom.” Though Amazon 
does not directly engage in these abuses, it has established a business 
model that indirectly promotes worker exploitation. Amazon requires 
that 999 orders out of 1,000 be made on time.78 To ensure on time 
deliveries, Amazon monitors drivers through handheld package scan-
ners known as “rabbits.”79 A typical route may exceed 250 deliveries 
in a single day, and it is well-reported that drivers routinely work long 
hours, skip meals, and urinate in bottles to stay on track.80 Faced with 
razor-thin profit margins, intermediaries have withheld pay from driv-
ers to stay afloat.81 To cut costs and maintain contracts over competi-
tors, intermediaries even engage in misclassification, labelling their 
drivers as independent contractors and then forcing them to sign con-
tracts lowering their own rate.82 
This exploitation of workers is the direct consequence of the 
choices made by leads like Amazon. The artificially low contract 
prices that Amazon and others are able to extract from intermediaries 
directly affect the way in which intermediaries treat their workers and 
whether workers receive minimum wage and overtime.83 This sweat-
ing system is the result of a rational incentive structure; to put an end 
to this worker exploitation, laws must be introduced to curtail these 
incentives. As Shirley Lung states, “[t]he strong, direct, and foreseea-
ble nexus between low contract prices and sweatshop conditions jus-
tifies the imposition of joint liability.”84 But does the use of 
 
 76. AMAZON LOGISTICS, https://logistics.amazon.com/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
 77. After the Military, an Entrepreneur Is Born, AMAZON.COM: TRANSP. BLOG (Jan. 21, 
2019), https://blog.aboutamazon.com/transportation/after-the-military-an-entrepreneur-is-born. 
 78. Callahan, supra note 7. 
 79. Peterson, supra note 75. 
 80. Id. 
 81. The Cost of Next-Day Delivery, supra note 66. 
 82. Milton Sanchez Deposition of Aug. 21, 2012 at 42, 92, Sanchez v. Lasership, Inc., 937 
F.Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Va. 2013) (1:12-cv-00246-GBL-TRJ), http://big.assets.huffing-
tonpost.com/milton_sanchez_deposition2.pdf; Jamieson, supra note 73. 
 83. Lung, supra note 26, at 302. 
 84. Id. at 353. 
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intermediaries inherently cause more harm than good? If not, what 
makes it so deleterious when Amazon uses intermediaries? 
III.  THE BENEFITS OF INTERMEDIARIES AND THE FRANCHISE MODEL 
Undeniably, the use of intermediaries can have strong, positive 
effects on consumers. Amazon’s business strategy of amassing inter-
mediaries and avoiding employment costs has allowed it to provide 
one- or two-day shipping in the contiguous United States for a low 
monthly payment. Since 2015, Amazon has nearly tripled its logistics 
infrastructure, spurring its competitors to innovate their own sys-
tems.85 By tightening delivery times, e-commerce is increasingly be-
coming a viable alternative to brick-and-mortar shopping—and con-
sumers have placed greater value in e-commerce during the COVID-
19 pandemic.86 
Perhaps most importantly, the use of intermediaries fosters entre-
preneurship. Each intermediary is its own business, buoyed by the la-
bor needs of its lead, but free to grow and branch out in any way it 
sees fit. The leaders who choose to run an intermediary do not just 
make a living—they develop managerial experience and build credi-
bility as business owners. This expertise is valuable and will translate 
to new ventures should these entrepreneurs choose to move on to 
greener pastures. 
Small businesses can themselves benefit from the use of interme-
diaries. An entrepreneur who lacks the capital or know-how to manage 
their own workers may nevertheless build a business by outsourcing 
his labor needs to others. Over one million small- and medium-sized 
businesses sell their products on Amazon, and many choose Amazon’s 
delivery network for their shipping needs.87 By taking advantage of 
Amazon, entrepreneurs outsource the costs of customer service, ship-
ment of individual orders, and returns.88 
 
 85. Kim, supra note 61. 
 86. Sarah Perez, COVID-19 Pandemic Accelerated Shift to E-Commerce by 5 Years, New Re-
port Says, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 24, 2020, 8:42 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/08/24/covid-19-
pandemic-accelerated-shift-to-e-commerce-by-5-years-new-report-says/. 
 87. Jeff Wilke, Small Businesses Reaching Customers Around the World, AMAZON.COM: 
SMALL BUS. BLOG (May 3, 2018), https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/small-business/small-
businesses-reaching-customers-around-the-world. 
 88. Seller Page, AMAZON.COM, https://sell.amazon.com/fulfill.html (last visited Feb. 21, 
2021). 
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A reasonable person could believe that the benefits of using inter-
mediaries outweigh the risk of sweatshop conditions. In fact, the fran-
chise model provides an example of intermediary use that does not 
necessarily result in sweatshop conditions.89 The differences between 
the franchise model and Amazon’s use of intermediaries provide in-
sight into the ways that established financial incentives can counteract 
downward wage pressures. 
Under a general franchise contract, the franchisor sells the fran-
chisee a license to use the franchisor’s brand name at a particular lo-
cation for a specified period of time; the franchisee pays this upfront 
fee and agrees to give the franchisor a portion of its revenues.90 To 
maintain the reputation of the brand, the franchise contract includes 
precise provisions regarding operating policies.91 A franchise agree-
ment presents a unique opportunity for entrepreneurs: it allows them 
to gain experience as the owner of a business with an established rep-
utation and a successful business strategy.92 The franchisor gains ac-
cess to a new market, fostering inter-brand competition.93 
Much like the lead-intermediary relationship, the franchise model 
provides franchisors the means to retain indirect control of the venture 
while avoiding the costs and liabilities of day-to-day operations.94 In 
fact, prior to Proposition 22’s passage, Uber and Lyft considered the 
franchise model as an alternative to classifying their drivers as em-
ployees under California’s AB 5.95 Though franchisee-owned busi-
nesses tend to engage in more hour and wage violations than their 
franchisor-owned counterparts,96 the franchise model seems less sus-
ceptible to sweatshop conditions and the so-called race to the bottom. 
 
 89. This is not to say that the franchise model has no effect on downward wage pressures. See 
generally Andrew Elmore, Franchise Regulation for the Fissured Economy, 86 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 907 (2018) (discussing the franchise model and its effects on employment law compliance). 
 90. MinWoong Ji & David Weil, Does Ownership Structure Influence Regulatory Behavior? 
The Impact of Franchising on Labor Standards Compliance 5 (Bos. U. Sch. Mgmt., Working Paper 
No. 2010-21, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1623387. 
 91. Id. at 6. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 191, 195–96 (2010). 
 94. Elmore, supra note 89, at 915. 
 95. Kate Conger, Uber and Lyft Consider Franchise-Like Model in California, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/18/technology/uber-lyft-franchise-califor-
nia.html. 
 96. Ji & Weil, supra note 90, at 36–37. On average, a franchisee-owned business owes $4,265 
more in back wages. Id. at 36. 
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Why is this? For one, the franchisor does not benefit from direct 
competition between its franchisees.97 The franchisor collects revenue 
from each franchisee-owned business and thus has an incentive to en-
sure the success of each franchisee.98 Rather than pitting franchisees 
against each other, as Amazon does with its intermediaries, franchi-
sors seek to maximize their profit by boosting the royalties and fees 
they receive from their franchisees across the board.99 
Further, the franchise relationship itself incentivizes stronger co-
operation between the franchisor and the franchisee. Unlike Amazon’s 
contracts with its intermediaries, which it may terminate with ease,100 
a franchise agreement often requires a long-term relationship.101 Most 
franchises have relatively large upfront costs—they require a brick-
and-mortar storefront, industry-specific licensing, and extensive train-
ing from the franchisor.102 For these reasons, a franchise agreement 
may last as long as twenty years.103 Because the relationship is long-
term, the franchisor has an increased incentive to ensure franchisee-
owned businesses are run successfully. A franchisor cannot escape an 
unsuccessful franchise agreement without causing a breach of con-
tract.104 
Finally, the franchisor’s focus on its reputation incentivizes it to 
ensure that franchisees comply with labor law. Empirical research sug-
gests that franchisors consider labor compliance as a source of brand 
reputation.105 This is likely because franchises often involve direct 
contact with consumers in a way that Amazon’s delivery service does 
not: labor compliance may correlate to better service quality, or con-
sumers may be sensitive to publicly-visible labor violations.106 To this 
end, franchisors typically require training on compensation and bene-
fits107 and provide franchisees with payroll software to calculate gross 
 
 97. Id. at 2. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 6–7. 
 100. See The Cost of Next-Day Delivery, supra note 66. 
 101. See A Consumer’s Guide to Buying a Franchise, FED. TRADE COMM’N 2 (June 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/591a_buying_a_fran-
chise_sept_2020.pdf. 
 102. Id. at 1–2, 8. 
 103. Id. at 2. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Ji & Weil, supra note 90, at 37–38. 
 106. Id. at 38. 
 107. Elmore, supra note 89, at 921. 
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wages owed to employees.108 These efforts are not always successful 
in preventing labor violations,109 but they do represent a good faith 
effort to ensure labor compliance. Though the franchise model is not 
perfect, it provides a helpful example of intermediary use that does not 
necessarily entail flagrant labor violations. 
Unfortunately, neither the federal government nor California has 
developed law that adequately balances the beneficial aspects of labor 
outsourcing and the use of intermediaries while addressing the abuses 
of the lead-intermediary relationship. Despite strong assurances of the 
depth and breadth of employment law, both jurisdictions have devel-
oped lenient standards that allow nefarious leads, like Amazon, to 
avoid responsibility for their role in incentivizing labor violations. 
Nevertheless, the history of these standards provides a useful backdrop 
for a more robust joint employment doctrine. 
IV.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL LAW UNDER THE FAIR LABOR 
STANDARDS ACT OF 1938 
In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 
which greatly expanded the rights of workers and paved the way for 
joint employment analysis by providing an expansive definition of 
employment for the purpose of wage and hour actions.110 However, 
federal courts have failed to develop a common and effective frame-
work by which plaintiff workers can enforce their rights against leads 
such as Amazon. 
A.  History of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
The FLSA was born out of early twentieth-century shifts in the 
labor market that had led to extremely weak employee bargaining 
power regarding hours and wages.111 In the 1920s, as a result of col-
lapsed agricultural prices, nearly twenty million Americans moved 
from rural to urban areas.112 This emigration created an expansive pool 
 
 108. Id. at 928–29. 
 109. See, e.g., Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp., 944 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). McDonald’s 
supplied a franchisee-owned business with timekeeping software that did not correctly measure 
overtime. Id.; see discussion infra Part VIII. 
 110. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); see infra Section IV.B. 
 111. See Carl H. Petkoff, Note, Joint Employment Under the FLSA: The Fourth Circuit’s De-
cision to Be Different, 70 S.C. L. REV. 1125, 1127–28 (2019). 
 112. Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 18 HOFSTRA 
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 19, 97–98 (2000). 
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of labor in cities.113 At the same time, advances in technology led to 
greater industrial production efficiency, meaning more work could be 
performed with fewer workers.114 Competition for limited industrial 
positions put the average worker in a weak position for negotiating 
hours and wages.115 This lack of bargaining power was particularly 
pronounced among members of the new workforce, such as women, 
who were shunted into sweatshop conditions.116 At the time, there ex-
isted no federal wage or hour protections.117 
In the 1930s, in the midst of the Great Depression, President 
Franklin Roosevelt led efforts to create federal law addressing this dis-
crepancy in bargaining power and the resulting exploitation of 
sweated workers.118 His early efforts, such as the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, did not survive scrutiny by the Lochner Court, but in a 
joint effort with Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, Congress passed 
the FLSA in 1938.119 The Act established a national minimum wage, 
set a maximum weekly workload without overtime of forty-four hours 
(to decrease to forty hours within three years), and eliminated child 
labor.120 
The consequences of the Act were immense. Congress described 
its intent in passing the Act as to eliminate “labor conditions detri-
mental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living neces-
sary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.”121 The 
Supreme Court later maintained that the FLSA was meant “to elimi-
nate, as rapidly as practicable, substandard labor conditions through-
out the nation.”122 At the time the Act passed, eleven million workers 
benefited from these new regulations.123 
 
 113. Id. at 98. 
 114. See Petkoff, supra note 111, at 1127. 
 115. Harris, supra note 112, at 98. 
 116. Id. at 50–51, 98. 
 117. Id. at 20. 
 118. Id. at 103; Petkoff, supra note 111, at 1128. 
 119. Petkoff, supra note 111, at 1128–30. 
 120. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 718, §§ 6, 7, 12, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 212). 
 121. Id. § 2. 
 122. Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 510 (1950). 
 123. Harris, supra note 112, at 140. 
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B.  Ensuring Compliance with the FLSA 
In passing such an expansive act, the proponents of the FLSA rec-
ognized the threat that businesses would avoid compliance.124 Con-
gress feared that business formalities, such as contractual terms desig-
nating workers as independent contractors rather than employees, 
would allow businesses to evade coverage.125 In an effort to curb such 
practices, the FLSA defined employment in a manner intended to 
reach a broader range of working relationships than just those covered 
under the common law.126 
Under the FLSA, the definition of “employ” includes “to suffer 
or permit to work.”127 The Supreme Court has remarked that “[a] 
broader or more comprehensive coverage of employees . . . would be 
difficult to frame.”128 Given the importance of labor rights, the Court 
has further stated that this definition “must not be interpreted or ap-
plied in a narrow, grudging manner.”129 
To further ensure compliance with the FLSA, the Department of 
Labor introduced the concept of joint employment to its regulations in 
1939.130 Though the FLSA does not itself use the words “joint em-
ployment,” the Supreme Court has recognized that its “suffer or per-
mit” definition of employment applies in joint employment actions.131 
Despite this, the Court has never determined the exact scope of this 
definition of employment, leaving its interpretation to the circuit 
courts.132 
 
 124. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937: Joint Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Educ. 
and Lab. and the H. Comm. on Lab. on S. 2475 and H.R. 7200, 75th Cong. 181 (1937) (statement 
of Hon. Frances Perkins, Sec. of Lab.) (“One of the greatest difficulties to overcome, if legislation 
of this character is to be successful is that of enforcement.”). 
 125. Kati L. Griffith, The Fair Labor Standards Act at 80: Everything Old Is New Again, 104 
CORNELL L. REV. 557, 594 (2019). 
 126. James Reif, ‘To Suffer or Permit to Work’: Did Congress and State Legislatures Say What 
They Meant and Mean What They Said?, 6 NE. U. L.J. 347, 351 (2013). 
 127. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2018). 
 128. United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362 (1945) (holding that the FLSA definition 
of employment applies to piece-rate workers, i.e., workers paid per unit of creation). 
 129. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944), super-
seded by statute in part, The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 49, 61 Stat. 84 (codified as 
amended at 27 U.S.C. §§ 251–262), as recognized in Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 
27 (2014). The Court specifies it is referring to 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). Id. at 597–98. 
 130. Petkoff, supra note 111, at 1130. 
 131. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728, 730 (1947) (holding that, 
under the FLSA, plaintiff meat boners could be employed by both a middleman who hired, paid, 
and supervised them and the business that engaged the middleman); Reif, supra note 126, at 352. 
 132. Reif, supra note 126, at 352–53. 
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C.  The Current Circuit Split 
Without guidance from the Supreme Court, the circuit courts are 
currently split in determining how the “suffer or permit” standard ap-
plies to leads in joint employment actions.133 Though the courts tend 
to cite to the “suffer or permit” language and the Supreme Court’s de-
termination of its broad coverage, they vary broadly in their applica-
tion, relying on verbiage and terms of art that appear nowhere in the 
statutory text.134 
The circuit split first became pronounced with Bonnette v. Cali-
fornia Health and Welfare Agency135 in 1983. In Bonnette, the Ninth 
Circuit elucidated four nonexclusive factors that “provide a useful 
framework” for determining joint employment: “whether the alleged 
employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) super-
vised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of em-
ployment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) 
maintained employment records.”136 This framework became known 
as the “economic realities” test and focuses on whether a worker is 
economically dependent upon the lead.137 
By contrast, the Second Circuit applies a six-factor test to deter-
mine whether the lead exercises “functional control” over a worker, 
developed in the 2003 case Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co.138 Most cir-
cuit courts apply some combination of factors from the economic re-
alities and functional control tests, often considering additional factors 
they feel are pertinent to the analysis.139 In 2017, the Fourth Circuit 
expressly rejected these two tests, instead developing its own six-fac-
tor test in Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc.,140 focusing on the 
 
 133. See Goldstein, supra note 50, at 1011; Petkoff, supra note 111, at 1134–39 (providing a 
brief description of each circuit court’s test for joint employment). 
 134. Reif, supra note 126, at 353–54. Reif notes concepts such as “economic reality,” “depend-
ence,” and “functional control.” Id. at 354. 
 135. 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 136. Id. at 1470. 
 137. Petkoff, supra note 111, at 1132. 
 138. 355 F.3d 61, 71–72 (2d Cir. 2003). The factors are (1) whether the worker used the putative 
employer’s premises and equipment; (2) whether the worker could easily shift work from one pu-
tative employer to the other; (3) the extent to which the work performed was integral to the putative 
employer’s business; (4) whether work responsibilities could be passed from subcontractor to an-
other without material changes; (5) the degree to which the putative employer supervised the 
worker; and (6) whether the worker worked exclusively or predominately for the putative employer. 
Id. at 72. District courts are also permitted to consider economic reality factors. See id. at 71. 
 139. Petkoff, supra note 111, at 1134–39. Of note, the modern Ninth Circuit test applies thirteen 
separate factors. Id. at 1137. 
 140. 848 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2017). 
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relationship between the putative joint employers, rather than on a 
lead’s relationship with the worker.141 Given the lack of clear statutory 
language and the absence of Supreme Court guidance, the federal 
framework for joint employment actions is varied and complex. Ra-
ther than a single and simple standard, the circuit courts have devel-
oped multiple tests, each relying upon a set of similar yet distinct fac-
tors. Consequently, legal scholars have criticized these tests as 
unpredictable and susceptible to manipulation by employers and 
judges.142 At the federal level, joint employment remains an unsettled 
area of law. 
V.  CALIFORNIA LAW UNDER MARTINEZ V. COMBS 
In 2010, by contrast, the California Supreme Court created a rel-
atively straightforward test for joint employment in the case of Mar-
tinez v. Combs.143 The court, for the first time in its history, interpreted 
the definitions of employment under the California Industrial Welfare 
Commission (IWC) wage orders, rejecting the FLSA’s definition.144 
In doing so, the court propounded upon the meaning of “suffering or 
permitting” work when determining whether a business is a joint em-
ployer for the purpose of state wage and hour actions.145 Ultimately, 
the court determined that a lead is liable where it (1) has knowledge 
 
 141. Id. at 139. The six factors are:  
(1) [w]hether, formally or as a matter of practice, the putative joint employers jointly 
determine, share, or allocate the power to direct, control, or supervise the worker, 
whether by direct or indirect means; (2) [w]hether, formally or as a matter of practice, 
the putative joint employers jointly determine, share, or allocate the power to—directly 
or indirectly—hire or fire the worker or modify the terms or conditions of the worker’s 
employment; (3) [t]he degree of permanency and duration of the relationship between 
the putative joint employers; (4) [w]hether, through shared management or a direct or 
indirect ownership interest, one putative joint employer controls, is controlled by, or is 
under common control with the other putative joint employer; (5) [w]hether the work is 
performed on a premises owned or controlled by one or more of the putative joint em-
ployers, independently or in connection with one another; and (6) [w]hether, formally or 
as a matter of practice, the putative joint employers jointly determine, share, or allocate 
responsibility over functions ordinarily carried out by an employer, such as handling 
payroll; providing workers’ compensation insurance; paying payroll taxes; or providing 
the facilities, equipment, tools, or materials necessary to complete the work.  
Id. at 141–42. 
 142. Lung, supra note 26, at 325–26. 
 143. See Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259 (Cal. 2010). 
 144. See id. at 267–68. 
 145. See id. at 279. 
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that work is occurring, (2) has the ability to prevent the work, and (3) 
fails to prevent the work.146 
In applying this definition of employment to the facts of the case, 
the court focused on the lead’s ability to prevent the work by hiring, 
firing, or supervising the worker,147 much like the Ninth Circuit’s eco-
nomic realities test. Where a lead possesses such control over a 
worker, liability for unpaid wages will attach.148  
A.  The Facts of Martinez 
In Martinez, a strawberry farmer, Munoz, was unable to pay 
wages to his seasonal agricultural workers.149 These workers brought 
action for unpaid wages under California Labor Code section 1194 
against both Munoz and two of the four produce merchants to whom 
he sold strawberries.150 Munoz declared bankruptcy and was dis-
charged from the case, leaving the plaintiff-workers’ only hope for 
recompense with a finding of liability on behalf of Munoz’s produce 
merchants.151 To establish such liability, the plaintiff-workers claimed 
that, along with Munoz, the produce merchants were their joint em-
ployers.152 
The problem for these plaintiff-workers, though, was that Munoz 
alone engaged in the common tasks of an employer, such as hiring, 
firing, and the setting of hours and wages.153 The produce merchants, 
for their part, had very limited interactions with the plaintiff-workers: 
all business was conducted through Munoz.154 Aside from minor su-
pervisory functions, such as training workers how to pack the straw-
berries, the merchants were not involved in the workers’ day-to-day 
operations.155 
 
 146. Id. at 281. 
 147. Id. at 282. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 265. 
 150. Id. at 266. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1194 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.) 
states in part, “any employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime 
compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance 
of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, 
reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” 
 151. Martinez, 231 P.3d at 263. 
 152. Id. at 266–67. 
 153. Id. at 264. 
 154. See id. at 284. 
 155. Id. at 286. 
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To maximize the chances of a finding of liability against the pro-
duce merchants, the plaintiff-workers contended that the California 
IWC definitions of “employ” and “employer” applied to the action.156 
Under these definitions, an employer “directly or indirectly, or 
through an agent or any other person, employs or exercises control 
over the wages, hours, or working conditions” of a worker.157 To “em-
ploy” itself means “to engage, suffer, or permit to work.”158 
The superior court granted summary judgment for the mer-
chants.159 The court of appeal, finding no case law interpreting the 
IWC’s definitions, applied the Ninth Circuit’s economic realities test 
for use under the FLSA and found that the merchants did not exercise 
adequate control over the plaintiffs to be deemed joint employers.160 
The California Supreme Court granted review to determine how the 
IWC definitions should be interpreted and applied in joint employ-
ment actions.161 
B.  Defining Employment Under the Industrial Welfare Commission 
Wage Orders 
The court reviewed the IWC wage orders to expound on its defi-
nitions of employment.162 In 1916, the IWC adopted its first wage or-
der, establishing a minimum wage for women and children in the veg-
etable canning industry.163 Though it did not contain a definition of 
employment, the order held businesses liable for unpaid wages where 
they “employ[ed] or suffer[ed] or permit[ted]” any woman or child to 
work.164 In 1947, the IWC added a separate definition of “employer” 
as one who “employs or exercises control over the wages, hours, or 
working conditions of any person.”165 Further, the court held that the 
IWC did not intend these definitions to supersede the common law 
employment relationship, as doing so would have withheld wage and 
 
 156. Id. at 266–67. 
 157. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11010(2)(F) (2001). The IWC provided industry-specific wage 
orders, but its definitions of employment remain the same across industries. See, e.g., id.; id. § 
11020(2)(F) (applying the same definitions of employment to the manufacturing and personal ser-
vices industries, respectively). 
 158. Id. § 11010(2)(D). 
 159. Martinez, 231 P.3d at 267. 
 160. Id. The Ninth Circuit’s economic realities test is discussed supra Section IV.C. 
 161. Martinez, 231 P.3d at 268. 
 162. Id. at 273–74. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 273 (quoting Cal. Indus. Welfare Comm’n, Order No. 1 (1916)). 
 165. Id. at 274 (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11140(2)(F) (2002)). 
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hour protections from regularly employed workers, who comprised 
the bulk of California’s workforce.166 
The court thus determined that “employ,” for the purposes of Cal-
ifornia wage and hour actions, has three definitions: “(a) to exercise 
control over the wages, hours or working conditions, or (b) to suffer 
or permit to work, or (c) to engage, thereby creating a common law 
employment relationship.”167 A business is liable for unpaid wages 
where any one definition is met.168 
Returning to the facts of the case, the Martinez court was quickly 
able to eliminate two of these definitions from application. The pro-
duce merchants neither engaged the plaintiff-workers by creating a 
common law master-servant relationship nor exercised control over 
their wages, hours, or working conditions.169 At all times, Munoz 
maintained control over his business operations.170 Wages were paid 
from his account, stemming from revenue from a variety of mer-
chants.171 The court conceded that supervision is a “working condi-
tion” under the IWC’s definitions,172 but found that the merchants’ 
ability to advise the plaintiffs about the manner by which strawberries 
were to be packed did not rise to the requisite level of supervision or 
control.173 Given this finding, the ultimate issue of the case was 
whether the produce merchants had “suffered or permitted” the work 
of the plaintiffs and could thus be held liable as employers.174 
In beginning its analysis of the “suffer or permit” standard, the 
court noted that the IWC was created in 1913, twenty-five years before 
the FLSA.175 The court thus held that IWC’s use of the “suffer or per-
mit” language, first promulgated in 1916, is not based upon federal 
law.176 The definition of “suffer or permit” in California is not con-
strained by the language of the FLSA or the economic realities test, 
which was first implied into the language of the FLSA by the United 
 
 166. Id. at 278. 
 167. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 168. See id. 
 169. Id. at 284–285, 287. 
 170. Id. at 284. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 286. 
 173. Id. at 286–87. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 270. 
 176. Id. at 279. 
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States Supreme Court in 1961177 and later developed by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Bonnette.178 In separating the IWC’s language from that of the 
FLSA, the court recognized that enforcement of state wage laws al-
lows for greater worker protections than the federal law affords.179 
To determine whether the produce merchants “suffered or permit-
ted” the work performed by the worker-plaintiffs, the court was thus 
required to develop its own interpretation of the words. The court ex-
plained that the language first appeared in model child labor laws in 
the early 1900s.180 The court then purported to base its interpretation 
of the language on case law resulting from the application of these 
child labor laws.181 The court found that the IWC did not intend “suf-
fer or permit” to mean anything other than its meaning in these early 
cases and decided that “suffer or permit” would be given its historical 
meaning.182 
In reviewing several child labor cases, the Martinez court deter-
mined that the “suffer or permit” language was used to create liability 
even where no common law employment relationship existed between 
the child and the purported employer.183 A business proprietor “suf-
fered or permitted” the work of a child “working in his or her business” 
by acquiescing to the work or failing to hinder it.184 This definition 
thus reached irregular working arrangements otherwise not covered by 
the common law.185 Instead, “the basis of liability [was] the owner’s 
failure to perform the duty of seeing to it that the prohibited condition 
does not exist.”186 Utilizing these cases, the Martinez court concluded 
that a business “suffers or permits” work, and is thus liable under wage 
and hour actions, when the business (1) has knowledge that work is 
occurring, (2) has the ability to prevent the work, and (3) fails to pre-
vent the work.187 
 
 177. Id. (citing Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961)). 
 178. See discussion supra Section IV.C. 
 179. Martinez, 231 P.3d at 280–81. 
 180. Id. at 273. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 281. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. (a businessowner “shall not employ by contract, nor shall he permit by acquiescence, 
nor suffer by a failure to hinder” the work (quoting Curtis & Gartside Co. v. Pigg, 134 P. 1125, 
1129 (Okla. 1913))). 
 185. Id. at 273. 
 186. Id. at 281 (emphasis omitted) (quoting People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-
Decker Co., 167 N.Y.S. 958, 961 (App. Div. 1917)). 
 187. Id. 
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C.  Martinez’s Narrowing of the “Suffer or Permit” Standard 
 Applying this definition to the facts of the case, the Martinez 
court noted the potential power of such a broad definition of employ-
ment. Finding that the produce merchants lacked direct power to pre-
vent the plaintiffs from working, the court nonetheless mused that the 
merchants may have prevented the plaintiffs’ work by ceasing to buy 
strawberries from Munoz.188 Without a purchaser, there would be no 
reason to produce strawberries, and thus no reason to hire laborers to 
work.189 The court decided that such indirect forms of preventing work 
should not be considered when assessing employment under the “suf-
fer or permit” standard.190 If a merchant could be found to be an em-
ployer simply because they purchased produce, would an individual 
consumer of strawberries also employ the workers who harvested 
them?191 
Instead, the court focused on direct means by which a business 
may prevent work, finding that Munoz alone had the power to “hire 
and fire [the plaintiff-workers] . . . and to tell them when and where to 
report to work.”192 According to the Martinez court, a purported em-
ployer has the ability to prevent work, and thus suffers or permits 
work, only if it has control over the hiring, firing, or supervision of a 
worker.193 As will be shown, this is a substantial narrowing of the def-
inition from the understanding of the child labor cases where the “suf-
fer or permit” language first appeared. 
The Martinez court ultimately affirmed the merchants’ motion for 
summary judgment, holding that the merchants did not (1) control the 
plaintiffs’ hours, wages, or working conditions, (2) establish a com-
mon law employment relationship with the plaintiffs, or (3) suffer or 
permit the plaintiffs’ work.194 
D.  The Aftermath of Martinez 
Following Martinez, courts have continued to focus their review 
of the “suffer or permit” standard of employment on the lead’s ability 
to hire, fire, or supervise a worker. In two recent cases, the California 
 
 188. Id. at 282. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See id. 
 194. Id. at 287. 
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Courts of Appeal were asked to determine whether the franchisor Shell 
was a joint employer of workers employed by its franchisees for the 
purpose of wage and hour actions. In Henderson v. Equilon Enter-
prises,195 the court found that Shell “had no power to fire plaintiff, hire 
his replacement, or prevent him from working” despite the ability of 
Shell to ask the franchisee to “remove” employees with good cause.196 
In Curry v. Equilon Enterprises,197 the court concluded that Shell 
“could not acquiesce” to the worker’s employment because the fran-
chisee was in control of its workers’ hiring, firing, and daily tasks.198 
Finally, in Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp.,199 the Ninth Circuit, focus-
ing on Curry’s analysis, applied California law to find that McDon-
ald’s did not suffer or permit the work of its franchisee’s workers be-
cause it held no power over hiring or firing.200 
Under Martinez, the “suffer or permit” standard of employment 
hardly extends beyond the common law definition. By focusing on a 
lead’s direct control over a worker through hiring, firing, and supervi-
sion, the court’s holding is evocative of the master-servant relation-
ship. Despite noting that the IWC issued the standard to reach irregular 
working arrangements not covered by the common law,201 the Mar-
tinez court nevertheless greatly limited its application. The Curry court 
went further, insinuating that the ability to prevent work never con-
cerns the lead’s ability to hinder the intermediary from engaging the 
plaintiff in work.202 This interpretation of “suffer or permit” does not 
match what the California Supreme Court would later call the IWC’s 
“exceptionally broad” standard.203 
VI.  DYNAMEX: RETURNING TO A BROAD UNDERSTANDING OF “SUFFER 
OR PERMIT” 
In 2018, the California Supreme Court reexamined the “suffer or 
permit” standard in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior 
 
 195. 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 738 (Ct. App. 2019). 
 196. Id. at 747. 
 197. 233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 295 (Ct. App. 2018). 
 198. Id. at 311. 
 199. 944 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 200. Id. at 1031. 
 201. Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 273 (Cal. 2010). 
 202. Curry, 233 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 311–12 (“[The failure to prevent work from occurring] does 
not concern failing to hinder a third party . . . . ”). 
 203. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 31 (Cal. 2018). 
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Court.204 Unlike Martinez, Dynamex was not a joint employment case, 
but rather focused on the misclassification of workers as independent 
contractors.205 The court introduced the ABC test to determine 
whether the hiring business misclassified workers as independent con-
tractors, allowing the business to avoid providing employment 
rights.206 The ABC test created a rebuttable assumption of employ-
ment for plaintiff-workers and established three prongs an employer 
must meet to avoid an action under the IWC wage orders.207 
Of great importance, the court implemented the ABC test as part 
of the “suffer or permit” standard.208 In establishing the ABC test, the 
court relied heavily upon Martinez and its underlying child labor 
cases.209 However, the ABC test’s application of the “suffer or permit” 
standard only begins with Martinez’s interpretation of the ability to 
hire, fire, or supervise a worker. The Dynamex court found that, in 
addition to this control analysis, a business may also be found to be an 
employer wherever a worker has performed work in the usual course 
of the alleged employer’s business.210 
A.  The Facts of Dynamex 
In 2004, Dynamex, a nationwide same-day delivery service much 
like Amazon, reclassified its delivery drivers as independent contrac-
tors to avoid the costs of employment.211 The drivers were required to 
provide their own vehicles and pay all transportation costs.212 They 
were required to pay for Dynamex uniforms, which they were ex-
pected to wear.213 In some cases, drivers were further required to pur-
chase and display Dynamex decals on their vehicles.214 Dynamex set 
the rates to be charged for delivery and controlled the number and na-
ture of deliveries its drivers obtained.215 
 
 204. See id. at 1. 
 205. Id. at 5. 
 206. Id. at 7. 
 207. Id. at 36–40. 
 208. Id. at 26, 37. 
 209. See id. at 37. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 8. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
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Charles Lee, one such driver, led a class action against Dynamex 
alleging labor violations, including a failure to pay overtime, based on 
the premise that Dynamex misclassified its drivers as independent 
contractors when they should have been classified as employees.216 
Lee and the other plaintiffs argued that the three standards of employ-
ment elucidated in Martinez were applicable to the question of worker 
misclassification.217 Dynamex, by contrast, argued that Martinez ap-
plied only to joint employment cases, and that the common law test 
for employment laid out in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of 
Industrial Relations218 was controlling.219 The California Supreme 
Court granted the petition for review to consider whether the defini-
tions of employment under the IWC’s wage orders, standardized under 
Martinez, applied to misclassification claims.220 
B.  Dynamex’s Holding 
The Dynamex court ultimately found that the “suffer or permit” 
standard of employment applies to the question of misclassification.221 
Following Martinez, the Dynamex court reemphasized the authority of 
the IWC to promulgate the definition of “employ” that governs the 
application of California’s wage orders.222 It again examined the child 
labor cases from which the “suffer or permit” language was bor-
rowed.223 It recognized the “exceptionally broad” scope of the stand-
ard.224 
Most importantly, the Dynamex court justified its decision by ex-
pounding upon one of the findings of Martinez. Quoting Martinez, the 
Dynamex court held that the “suffer or permit” standard “must be in-
terpreted and applied broadly to include within the covered ‘em-
ployee’ category all individual workers who can reasonably be viewed 
as ‘working in [the hiring entity’s] business,’” including those mis-
classified as independent contractors.225 Thus, a hiring entity would 
 
 216. Id. at 9–10. 
 217. Id. at 10. 
 218. 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989). 
 219. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 10. 
 220. Id. at 7. 
 221. Id. at 26. 
 222. Id. at 29. 
 223. Id. at 26–27. 
 224. Id. at 31–32. 
 225. Id. at 32 (quoting Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 281 (Cal. 2010)) (“A proprietor who 
knows that persons are working in his or her business without having been formally hired, or while 
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not be liable under the “suffer or permit” standard for a traditional in-
dependent contractor operating their own independent business,226 but 
would be liable for all workers, regardless of classification, who could 
reasonably be viewed as working in the hiring entity’s business.227 
Using the framework of the “suffer or permit” standard, the Dy-
namex court then introduced the ABC test for determining whether a 
worker has been misclassified as an independent contractor.228 Under 
the ABC test, a worker is presumed to be an employee of the hiring 
entity unless the hiring entity proves 
(A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of 
the hiring entity in connection with the performance of the 
work, both under the contract for the performance of the 
work and in fact; and 
(B) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual 
course of the hiring entity’s business; and 
(C) that the worker is customarily engaged in an inde-
pendently established trade, occupation, or business of the 
same nature as the work performed.229 
The ABC test was codified in 2019 by California’s AB 5.230 The in-
troduction of the ABC test represented a major expansion of employ-
ment rights for workers improperly classified as independent contrac-
tors. 
C.  The Usual Course of Business: Expanding the “Suffer or Permit” 
Standard 
Dynamex’s understanding of the “suffer or permit” standard of 
employment begins with a reconsideration of the analysis of Martinez. 
Under the Martinez joint employment analysis, the test of whether a 
lead employed a worker is based on the lead’s ability to hire, fire, or 
supervise the worker.231 Prong A of the ABC test closely mirrors this 
analysis with its focus on the “control and direction” a hiring entity 
has over performance of the work. The Dynamex court, however, 
 
being paid less than the minimum wage, clearly suffers or permits that work by failing to prevent 
it, while having the power to do so.” (emphasis added) (quoting Martinez, 231 P.3d at 281)). 
 226. Id. at 33. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 35–36. 
 229. Id. at 35. 
 230. Assemb. B. 5, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
 231. Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 282 (Cal. 2010); see supra Section V.C. 
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recognized Prong A as a form of the common law test for employment 
and included it within the ABC test only because if the common law 
test is met, the broader “suffer or permit” standard must also neces-
sarily be met.232 The court drew a comparison between Prong A and 
the common law Borello test, suggesting that Martinez’s focus on hir-
ing, firing, and supervision—all forms of control—was merely a revi-
sion of common law principles of employment.233 
In establishing Prong B, the Dynamex court recognized that the 
“suffer or permit” standard operates “independent of the question of 
control.”234 Calling upon Martinez and its child labor antecedents, the 
court, for a second time, acknowledged that the “suffer or permit” 
standard was intended to “bring within the ‘employee’ category all 
individuals who can reasonably be viewed as working ‘in [the hiring 
entity’s] business.’”235 This language, mentioned though overlooked 
in Martinez, represents a major departure from Martinez’s joint em-
ployment analysis. 
In addition to the Martinez control factors, the Dynamex court 
found that a business also suffers or permits work, and thus employs 
the worker, when that work is comparable to the work expected of an 
employee of the business.236 The court provided helpful examples. A 
retail company that hires a plumber to fix its pipes does not suffer or 
permit the work because the retail company is not in the business of 
fixing pipes.237 The plumber is not employed—he is rather an inde-
pendent contractor engaged in their own independent business.238 
However, a garment manufacturer suffers or permits the work of la-
borers engaged in sewing garments regardless of business formalities 
because the manufacturer is in the business of sewing garments.239 
With this focus on the usual course of business, the Dynamex court 
 
 232. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 36 (“[B]ecause a worker who is subject, either as a matter of con-
tractual right or in actual practice, to the type and degree of control a business typically exercises 
over employees would be considered an employee under the common law test, such a worker 
would, a fortiori, also properly be treated as an employee for purposes of the suffer or permit to 
work standard.”). 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 37. 
 235. Id. (citing Martinez, 231 P.3d at 282). 
 236. Id. Of note, the Dynamex court cites Goldstein, supra note 50, at 1159. In his article, Gold-
stein called for this analysis to apply to labor contracting schemes like the lead-intermediary rela-
tionship. Goldstein, supra note 50, at 1161–62. 
 237. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 37. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
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established that the “suffer or permit” standard has a separate analysis 
distinct from the issue of control—and distinct from the ability of a 
business to hire, fire, or supervise a worker. 
Nevertheless, subsequent courts have not extended this broaden-
ing of the “suffer of permit” standard to the joint employment context. 
The Curry court found that the ABC test was limited to misclassifica-
tion claims,240 but did not consider how Dynamex’s new formulation 
of the “suffer or permit” standard might affect joint employment anal-
ysis. The Ninth Circuit, in Salazar, summarily dismissed the idea that 
Dynamex has application outside of misclassification claims.241 The 
Henderson court considered the applicability of Prong B analysis in 
the joint employment context, but found that because workers in such 
cases are employees of the intermediary, and thus already entitled—at 
least nominally—to employment protections, such analysis would 
make “little sense.”242 However, as the Lines case showed, the exist-
ence of employment protections does not guarantee that a worker will 
recover for wage and hour violations. Further, the history of the “suf-
fer or permit” language, and the policy concerns surrounding its crea-
tion, strongly supports Prong B analysis in joint employment cases. 
VII.  REEXAMINING JOINT EMPLOYMENT IN THE WAKE OF DYNAMEX 
Dynamex’s expanded understanding of the “suffer or permit” 
standard falls much more closely in line with its historical application 
in the child labor cases from which the IWC borrowed the language. 
The policy concerns that Dynamex and the ABC test are meant to ad-
dress are equally present in the joint employment context. Dynamex’s 
“usual course of business” analysis should complement Martinez’s 
control factors in the joint employment context. There is no reason to 
have separate tests for the “suffer or permit” definition based on 
whether a wage action is brought as a joint employment or worker 
misclassification claim. By reconciling Martinez with Dynamex, Cal-
ifornia courts will bring clarity to the question of employment and bet-
ter protect the rights of exploited workers. 
 
 240. Curry v. Equilon Enters., 233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 295, 314 (Ct. App. 2018). 
 241. Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp., 944 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 242. Henderson v. Equilon Enters., 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 738, 753 (Ct. App. 2019). 
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A.  Legislative and Judicial History Supports Dynamex’s 
Interpretation 
In both Martinez and Dynamex, the California Supreme Court re-
lied on the holdings of early child labor cases, where the “suffer or 
permit” standard was first used and developed, to determine the intent 
of the IWC in promulgating the standard.243 Martinez directly cites 
three such cases when developing its understanding of the standard: 
Curtis & Gartside Co. v. Pigg,244 Purtell v. Philadelphia & Reading 
Coal & Iron Co.,245 and People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms-
Slawson-Decker Co.246 Though these cases do not involve direct joint 
employment, they stand for the principle that suffering or permitting 
work is not limited to a firm’s ability to exercise control over the 
worker in question. Rather, early courts, and by extension the IWC, 
believed that a firm suffers or permits work within the usual course of 
its business by failing to prevent the work through any means available 
to it. 
In each of these cases, businesses passively accepted the benefits 
of labor performed by children despite the presence of statutes prohib-
iting the suffering of child labor. Each business was held liable regard-
less of whether it possessed any direct control over the child laborer 
in question. In Purtell, for example, employees of a coal yard hired an 
eleven-year-old to serve as their water-boy.247 Though the coal yard 
did not employ the boy, and thus could not directly control his actions, 
the court nonetheless held the coal yard liable because it had 
knowledge of the work being performed and had not attempted to pre-
vent the work by reprimanding the employees who hired the boy.248 
These courts accepted that a business has a “duty of using reason-
able care” to ensure that child labor does not take place.249 In Sheffield, 
employees of a milk distributor hired children to stand guard over their 
wagons while they left to make individual milk deliveries.250 In hold-
ing that the distributor suffered the children’s work, the court noted 
that the purpose of labor statutes is 
 
 243. See, e.g., Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 281 (Cal. 2010); Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 37. 
 244. 134 P. 1125 (Okla. 1913). 
 245. 99 N.E. 899 (Ill. 1912). 
 246. 167 N.Y.S. 958 (App. Div. 1917). 
 247. Purtell, 99 N.E. at 900. 
 248. Id. at 902. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Sheffield, 167 N.Y.S. at 959. 
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to impose upon the owner or proprietor of a business the duty 
of seeing to it that the condition prohibited by the statute does 
not exist. . . . The duty is an absolute one, and it remains with 
him whether he carries on the business himself or intrusts 
[sic] the conduct of it to others.251 
This is an important insight about the reach of the “suffer or per-
mit” standard. In Curtis, a factory foreman permitted a child to engage 
in dangerous tasks that he was statutorily barred from performing.252 
Under agency law, the court found the manufacturer liable because it 
had delegated its agent, the foreman, express authority to oversee its 
operations.253 A lead that entrusts its usual course of business to an 
intermediary is functionally undistinguishable from a company that 
delegates authority to supervisors to carry out its work. It follows that, 
in both cases, a business has a duty to ensure that prohibited conditions 
do not exist. 
The ABC test—and Prong B in particular—acknowledges a com-
mon thread among these child labor cases: the purpose of the “suffer 
or permit” standard is to create an extensive net of liability for firms 
that benefit from labor violations. Just as the child labor cases did not 
center on joint employment, neither did they deal directly with the 
misclassification of workers. Nevertheless, they form the basis for the 
ABC test because the “suffer or permit” standard was meant to be ap-
plicable in all employment contexts. The Dynamex court recognized 
that the standard extends employment status to workers regardless of 
their employer’s ability to directly control their work—which forms 
the heart of the Martinez analysis. Employment—and the resulting li-
ability for wage and hour violations—exists not just where a business 
can hire, fire, or supervise a worker; it exists wherever a firm know-
ingly benefits from work performed in the usual course of its business 
and fails to prevent that work.254 In this way, Dynamex mirrors the 
intent of the IWC and early courts in utilizing the “suffer or permit” 
language. 
Though the ABC test is designed for misclassification claims,255 
there is no reason its inclusion of the “usual course of business” 
 
 251. Id. at 960 (emphasis added). 
 252. Curtis & Gartside Co. v. Pigg, 134 P. 1125, 1127 (Okla. 1913). 
 253. Id. at 1129. 
 254. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 35 (Cal. 2018). 
 255. Prong C, in particular, asks whether the worker is engaged in their own business, an issue 
not present in joint employment cases. “Trying to apply Part C of the ABC test to joint employer 
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analysis under the “suffer or permit” standard should be limited to 
such claims. The “suffer or permit” standard has always relied upon 
the common definitions of the two words.256 It makes little sense for 
the standard to refer only to the Martinez control factors in joint em-
ployment claims but to further encapsulate the “usual course of busi-
ness” analysis in worker misclassification claims. Rather, courts 
should apply the standard uniformly to both types of claims. Such a 
standardization would simplify the law and provide recognition that 
the policy concerns of Dynamex are present in all wage and hour 
claims regardless of their form. 
B.  Policy Considerations Favor Dynamex’s Interpretation 
In Dynamex, the court acknowledged two broad policy concerns 
in favor of establishing the ABC test and its “usual course of business” 
analysis. The first is largely unique to misclassification claims—clas-
sifying employees as independent contractors causes the federal and 
state governments to lose billions in tax revenue.257 Because interme-
diaries in the lead relationship employ their workers, courts like Hen-
derson have found lost tax revenue an inapplicable concern.258 
But more importantly, Dynamex recognized that the broad “usual 
course of business” analysis is necessary to prevent the so-called “race 
to the bottom” where workers are stripped of the protections inherent 
in their employment.259 The court identified that such a race occurs at 
both individual and business-to-business levels. First, workers that de-
sire employment protections are in competition with—and will ulti-
mately be harmed by—those who are willing to forgo such protections 
for a paycheck.260 Secondly, and as discussed above, law-abiding busi-
nesses are in competition with those willing to skirt employment 
laws.261 Thus, the enforcement of employment laws must be broad and 
robust to “create a level playing field” at both levels and to prevent the 
 
claims recalls the proverbial square peg in a round hole.” Henderson v. Equilon Enters., 253 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 738, 754 (Ct. App. 2019). 
 256. See Curtis, 134 P. at 1129 (defining “suffer” to mean “not to forbid or hinder; to tolerate”); 
Reif, supra note 126, at 380. 
 257. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 5. 
 258. Henderson, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 752–53. 
 259. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 37–38. 
 260. Id. at 37. 
 261. Id. at 38; see discussion supra Section II.A. 
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downward pressure on wages and conditions inherent in such eco-
nomic competition.262 
This justification is just as applicable to the lead-intermediary re-
lationship as it is to worker misclassification. A lead outsourcing its 
labor needs to smaller, competing intermediaries creates the same 
downward pressure on wages and conditions as a business that gains 
an unfair competitive edge by misclassifying its workers. Courts can-
not simply focus on the role the intermediary plays in exploiting work-
ers. The problem stems from the lead—so long as intermediaries pro-
tect the lead from liability, worker exploitation will occur. For every 
intermediary that a court targets, a new one will pop up in its place to 
support the lead. Thus, courts should rather focus on the role of the 
lead in perpetuating worker exploitation. 
Holding the lead liable for the abuses of its intermediaries makes 
economic sense. First, the lead is in the best position to ensure com-
pliance with labor law: 
The purpose of the broad imposition of liability on business 
owners with the power to prevent the work is to provide in-
centives for them to assert their power to prevent the viola-
tions. It is presumed that the power to prevent the perfor-
mance of the work carries with it the power to allow the 
work, conditioned on compliance with minimum labor stand-
ards contained in these laws.263 
Secondly, the lead is in the best position to distribute the costs of labor 
compliance.264 Any efforts by a lead to prevent worker abuses, either 
by employing its own workers to perform the labor or by policing its 
intermediaries, will have economic costs compared to the status quo. 
Though these increased operational costs might be passed onto con-
sumers, it is undoubtedly preferable to allowing the costs of labor vi-
olations to fall arbitrarily upon workers attempting to support them-
selves and their families.265 
Finally, the lead is the party most susceptible to the deterrent ef-
fect of robust labor laws. Leads are fewer in number, have substantial 
assets, live long corporate lives266 and would be exposed to exorbitant 
 
 262. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 37–38. 
 263. Goldstein, supra note 50, at 1137. 
 264. See Aditi Bagchi, Production Liability, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2529–30 (2019). 
 265. See id. at 2530. 
 266. Id. 
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costs if found liable for labor violations. Further, they have reputa-
tional interests to consider.267 Here, Amazon provides an example. 
Following an exposé by Buzzfeed News and ProPublica, Senators 
Richard Blumenthal, Elizabeth Warren, and Sherrod Brown sent a let-
ter to Jeff Bezos questioning Amazon’s role in the abuse of its driv-
ers.268 The publicity Amazon received led it to cancel contracts with a 
number of intermediaries accused of labor violations and tort 
claims.269 If leads are held accountable for labor violations, they will 
be less likely to condone them. 
Ultimately, the primary concern of courts should be to ensure 
workers are protected by labor law. By focusing on the lead, rather 
than its intermediaries, the legal system will be better able to curb the 
“race to the bottom” and protect employment rights. By establishing a 
more robust joint employment regime, courts can create a broad in-
centive structure encouraging leads to avoid labor violations and better 
police their intermediaries. As shown by the franchise model, leads 
are less likely to allow labor violations by their intermediaries where 
incentives, legal or non-legal, exist to comply with labor laws. 
Ensuring labor compliance will result in increased costs for the 
lead, which will almost certainly pass these costs onto consumers. If 
leads choose to employ their own workers rather than rely on interme-
diaries, the entrepreneurial efforts of small business owners will be 
stifled. But Dynamex’s interpretation of the “suffer or permit” stand-
ard is not an extreme solution. With proper safeguards, a broad joint 
employment doctrine can target the nefarious aspects of the lead-in-
termediary relationship without eliminating the benefits that interme-
diary use provides to small businesses and entrepreneurs. 
VIII.  SAFEGUARDS PROVIDING FOR THE BENEFICIAL USE OF 
INTERMEDIARIES 
Undoubtedly, a joint employment doctrine that utilizes both the 
Martinez control factors and Dynamex’s usual course of business anal-
ysis will cast a broad net that captures bad actors like Amazon, as well 
 
 267. Id. 
 268. Letter from Sens. Richard Blumenthal, Elizabeth Warren and Sherrod Brown to Jeffrey 
Bezos, Chairman, President & CEO, Amazon.com Inc. (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.buzzfeed-
news.com/article/kenbensinger/blumenthal-elizabeth-warren-amazon-delivery. 
 269. Ken Bensinger et al., Amazon Is Firing Its Delivery Firms Following People’s Deaths, 
BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 12, 2019, 8:02 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ken-
bensinger/amazon-is-severing-contracts-with-delivery-firms-linked-to. 
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as innocuous—and even beneficial—uses of intermediaries, such as 
the franchise model. Because labor outsourcing can provide support 
for small businesses, and because the use of intermediaries fosters en-
trepreneurship, it is important that any joint employment doctrine does 
not fully eliminate intermediary relationships. Luckily, the usual 
course of business analysis is not all-encompassing, and the use of in-
demnification clauses can provide protection for businesses seeking to 
utilize intermediaries. Finally, the state legislature may choose to rec-
ognize a defense for leads accused of labor violations: a lead may be 
protected where it has made a good faith effort to ensure its interme-
diaries comply with labor laws. 
A.  The Limitations of the “Usual Course of Business” Analysis 
In its analysis of the “suffer or permit” standard, the Martinez 
court feared a joint employment doctrine that would ensnare every 
party involved in the work performed: from the farmer who hired la-
borers to pick his fruit to the consumer who ultimately bought the fruit 
at the grocery.270 But the Dynamex analysis has a limit: an alleged em-
ployer must be in the business of the work being performed. The Dy-
namex court explained this in simplistic terms: a retail store does not 
employ a plumber it hires to fixes its pipes because the store is not in 
the business of plumbing.271 Just so, neither does a fruit vendor or a 
consumer employ a farm laborer because these actors are not in the 
business of farming. But it is not always so clear where the line should 
be drawn. Is Uber a taxi service or a software developer? Is McDon-
ald’s in the business of flipping burgers or selling trademark licenses? 
E-commerce and the delivery industry provide an example of the lim-
its of the ABC test and of how small businesses may be sparred liabil-
ity under a robust joint employment regime. 
As mentioned previously, over one million small- and medium-
sized businesses choose Amazon’s delivery network over traditional 
carriers for their shipping needs.272 One could view these small Ama-
zon sellers as leads, with Amazon and its DSPs acting as intermediar-
ies. But one would be loath to find these sellers liable under joint em-
ployment theory for the workplace abuses of the delivery companies 
involved. Why? 
 
 270. Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 282 (Cal. 2010). 
 271. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 37 (Cal. 2018). 
 272. Wilke, supra note 87. 
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The answer: effective and profitable e-commerce requires the 
ability to efficiently deliver goods across the nation. Small entrepre-
neurial sellers lack the resources, infrastructure, and expertise to de-
velop such a network. Thus, they must rely upon separate entities, such 
as Amazon or FedEx, to effectuate delivery. The seller agrees to the 
listed shipping rates, and once the goods are in the hands of the carrier, 
the seller lacks any oversight over the process of delivery. Though the 
delivery is an intrinsic part of the seller’s business, the seller cannot 
be said to be in the business of delivery.273 Because of this, small 
sellers should not be responsible as joint employers for labor viola-
tions for which they lacked any power to prevent. The same can be 
said of all small businesses that lack the capital and expertise to over-
see their own labor needs. To provide clarity and consistency—and to 
encourage business ownership—the legislature could consider provid-
ing blanket exemptions from this analysis to particularly small busi-
nesses.274 
Amazon, though, is not a small business. Rather, it has a national 
delivery network, and it maintains control and oversight over the de-
livery of its goods that traditional sellers do not maintain. Because of 
this, delivery is within Amazon’s usual course of business.275 Amazon 
has far greater power to control the work performed and thus has the 
power to prevent labor violations from occurring. Unlike a traditional 
seller, Amazon can employ its own delivery drivers rather than out-
source to a third party, or it can exercise its influence over its interme-
diaries to ensure that labor violations do not occur. For Amazon, the 
use of intermediaries is a choice, and it is a choice that allows Amazon 
 
 273. This may explain why CAL. LAB. CODE § 2810.3 specifically precludes use of the usual 
course of business analysis to businesses that outsource their shipping needs to others. Shipping is 
a special industry that requires capital and know-how far beyond what could reasonably be expected 
of a typical business. 
 274. For example, CAL. LAB. CODE § 2810.3 exempts businesses “with a workforce of fewer 
than 25 workers, including those hired directly by the client employer and those obtained from, or 
provided by, any labor contractor” and businesses “with five or fewer workers supplied by a labor 
contractor or labor contractors to the client employer at any given time.” CAL. LAB. CODE 
§ 2810.3(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
 275. Though Amazon may claim to be a market platform rather than a delivery company, it 
seems pertinent to note that 112 million Amazon users pay monthly for two-day shipping (and, 
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to avoid employment laws while causing widespread harm to workers 
downstream. The imposition of joint employment is warranted where 
a lead could have prevented the conditions leading to its intermediar-
ies’ labor violations by exercising the other options available to it. This 
is not to say that Amazon must be prohibited from using intermediar-
ies, but if it seeks to avoid liability for wage and hour violations, it 
must seek other avenues of recourse. 
B.  Indemnification Clauses 
Though a robust joint employment doctrine will hold leads that 
outsource their labor needs liable as employers, these leads need not 
bear the full cost—or any of the cost—associated with legal claims 
stemming from alleged labor violations. A lead can continue to insu-
late itself from financial liability by requiring its intermediary to sign 
an indemnification clause under which it agrees to pay the damages, 
plus costs and fees, resulting from legal action against the lead.276 Un-
der such an arrangement, the lead would be liable for labor violations 
but would only suffer financial loss where its intermediary is under-
financed or judgment-proof. Such a setup would be beneficial for 
workers: plaintiffs like Jeffery Lines would no longer bear the burden 
of seeking recompense from a cash-poor intermediary. For leads, the 
potential for liability would create incentives to (1) seek out interme-
diaries with a track record of labor compliance,277 (2) promote labor 
compliance among its intermediaries, and (3) ensure that its contract 
prices account for the minimum wage. However, indemnification 
clauses—and the reduced risk of financial loss for labor violations 
they provide—would continue to make the use of intermediaries an 
attractive option. 
C.  Good Faith Efforts to Ensure Labor Compliance 
Finally, the state legislature may consider creating a new affirm-
ative defense providing basic protections for leads that have made a 
good faith effort to ensure their intermediaries comply with labor laws. 
The franchise model, for one, may be a lead-intermediary relationship 
worth protecting in such a manner, given its robust cultivation of en-
trepreneurism. Where a franchisor has sought to prevent labor 
 
 276. Goldstein, supra note 50, at 1145. 
 277. Id. 
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violations by its franchisees, and a franchisee has nevertheless prom-
ulgated such violations, courts might rightly hesitate to penalize the 
franchisor. 
Salazar provides an example of what might not constitute a good 
faith effort by a franchisor to prevent labor violations. In Salazar, the 
franchisor, McDonald’s, provided its franchisee with software meant 
to assist in scheduling, timekeeping, and determining overtime pay.278 
Unfortunately, the software did not correctly measure overtime and 
failed to schedule government-mandated rest breaks and second meal 
periods, causing the franchisee’s employees to miss out on overtime 
pay.279 Though the Ninth Circuit, utilizing the Martinez control fac-
tors, spared McDonald’s by finding that it was not a joint employer,280 
McDonald’s failure to program basic labor laws into its software, 
though, undoubtedly constitutes a lackluster attempt to ensure labor 
compliance. 
To protect itself from liability by taking advantage of a good faith 
defense, a lead must, somewhat paradoxically, take more control over 
its relationship with its intermediaries. But this is not a radical change. 
In the franchise model, for instance, franchisors already exercise sub-
stantial control: franchise agreements include strict provisions regard-
ing operating policies and quality assurance.281 Further, standard fran-
chise agreements already contain general provisions requiring the 
franchisee to operate in compliance with labor laws, including the 
FLSA.282 In Salazar, McDonald’s did not require its franchisee to uti-
lize its timekeeping software283 but had it made such a requirement—
and had the software been adequately programmed—the resulting la-
bor violations would likely not have occurred. This may be all that is 
required to establish a lead’s good faith effort to prevent labor viola-
tions, and such a relatively small change may truly protect workers 
from wage theft. 
Ultimately, a broad expansion of employment will provide incen-
tives for leads to actively engage in the prevention of labor violations. 
In some cases, this may lead to the termination of intermediary rela-
tionships: a lead may choose to exercise total control of an enterprise 
 
 278. Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp., 944 F.3d 1024, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 279. Id. at 1028. 
 280. Id. at 1032. 
 281. Ji & Weil, supra note 90, at 6. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Salazar, 944 F.3d at 1028. 
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if it will undoubtedly be held liable for the costs of employment. Nev-
ertheless, beneficial lead-intermediary relationships, and particularly 
the entrepreneurism that they foster, can be protected. Courts may use 
a well-rounded and fair usual course of business analysis to excuse 
small businesses that engage in labor outsourcing. Leads can protect 
themselves by including indemnification clauses in their contracts and 
by choosing labor-compliant intermediaries. The legislature can con-
sider new legal defenses for leads that adequately police their interme-
diaries. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
The California Supreme Court and state legislature—through Dy-
namex and AB 5, respectively—have signaled a strong intent to pro-
tect the employment rights of gig economy workers misclassified as 
independent contractors. In expressing the need for the robust ABC 
test, these bodies have pointed to the unfair advantage misclassifying 
companies have over those that employ their workers and the rise of 
income inequality created by eroding workplace protections.284 But 
these concerns are not limited to misclassification schemes. Rather, 
they exist wherever a business outsources its labor needs to avoid the 
costs and liability associated with employment. The lead-intermediary 
relationship, illustrated here by Amazon’s use of DSPs, creates condi-
tions that perpetuate substandard wages and other labor abuses. With-
out intervention, the use of this business practice will continue to ex-
asperate working conditions and place strain on fair market 
competition. 
To effectively respond to this problem, the court or legislature 
must simply extend their decisions in Dynamex and AB 5 to joint em-
ployment claims. Prong B of the ABC test—the usual course of busi-
ness analysis—will allow plaintiffs like Jeffery Lines to obtain recom-
pense from a lead where their intermediary employer is chronically 
undercapitalized due to the nature of the lead-intermediary relation-
ship. The legislative and judicial history of the “suffer or permit” def-
inition of employment—which governs both Dynamex’s ABC test and 
California’s current joint employment doctrine under Martinez—sup-
ports a comprehensive and dynamic employment standard. It makes 
 
 284. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 38 (Cal. 2018); Assemb. B. 
5, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
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little sense for the “suffer or permit” definition to be expansive in the 
context of misclassification claims but constricted to the ability to 
“hire, fire, or supervise” in joint employment analysis. More im-
portantly, the threat of litigation and liability for labor violations will 
encourage leads to develop business practices that better protect work-
ers’ rights. 
This answer is not a radical solution. Given the precedent of Dy-
namex and AB 5, California is in a unique position to extend labor 
protections without completely restructuring its governing law. In fact, 
under California Labor Code section 2810.3, the usual course of busi-
ness analysis is already an accepted standard in some cases of labor 
outsourcing.285 Furthermore, a more robust joint employment doctrine 
would not necessarily disrupt the benefits that labor outsourcing can 
provide to both business owners and consumers. The legislature may 
choose to provide additional protections to businesses, and the courts 
will continue to have discretion in applying the standard to specific 
factual circumstances. 
In the absence of extensive labor laws, fair wages and working 
conditions would not exist. For over 100 years, from the publishing of 
the IWC’s wage orders to the passage of AB 5, California has re-
mained at the forefront of providing labor protections to its citizens. 
The expansion of the joint employment doctrine is merely another step 
on that path. 
 
 
 285. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2810.3 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.); see dis-
cussion supra Section II.A. 
